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I. INTRODUCTION
We share this Earth with everything that grows. The first thunder of the
season, we go out and give thanks because it brings rain. Somehow we have to
go back to that kind of thinking.
With all of this experience, are we going to do anything different? Do you
think we're going to get up tomorrow and say, 'Today is a new day?"
I don't.
Oren Lyons, Chief of the Onondaga
Indian Nation1
For hundreds of years, this continent's Indians2 shared a spiri-
tual belief that they must respect and protect their Mother Earth
above all else.3 Today, however, many tribes no longer view the envi-
ronment as a bank of natural resources that they must shield and
shelter at any cost. Instead, the economic pressures of the twentieth
century-particularly underdevelopment, unemployment, and pov-
1. Dele Olojede, Indian Attitude Called Best Hope of Saving Earth, Newsday 11 (Feb. 24,
1990).
.2. This Note generally will employ the word "Indian" instead of "Native American" when
referring to the aboriginal inhabitants of the American continents and their descendants. This
choice is made solely to promote consistency with the federal government's preference for
adopting the term "Indian" in statutes, interagency departments, statute names, and references
in case law. Consider, for example, the "Indian Gaming and Regulatory Act," 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701
et seq. (1988); the "Bureau of Indian Affairs" of the Interior Department; the "Indian Resources
Section" of the Environment and Natural Resources Division, Department of Justice; New
Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324 (1983) (using the word "Indian" in its
discussions). The Author intends no disrespect toward any reader who might be particularly
sensitive to the use of the word "Indian" instead of "Native American."
3. Although it would be difficult, if not impossible, to generalize how the nation's various
Indian tribes regard what normatives call "the environment," a philosophy common to a large
group of Indians is that the planet's natural resources must be treated with immense respect
and admiration. These Indians view all the natural world-from individual blades of grass and
insects to raging rivers and flocks of birds-as parts of the "Cycle of Life." See Steve Wall and
Harvey Arden, White Deer of Autumn, ed., Wisdomkeepers 24 (Beyond Words, 1990) (quoting
Onondaga Clan Mother Audrey Shenandoah). The Indian attitude is to acknowledge and honor
equally all elements within the Cycle of Life:
[AIIl life is equal. That's our philosophy. You have to respect life-all life, not just your
own. The key word is "respect." Unless you respect the earth, you destroy it. Unless
you respect all life as much as your own life, you become a destroyer, a murderer.
Man sometimes thinks he's been elevated to be the controller, the ruler. But he's
not. He's only a part of the whole. Man's job is not to exploit but to oversee, to be a
steward. Man has responsibility, not power.
Id. at 67 (quoting Oren Lyons).
It is even wrong to generalize that all Indians view the planet as 'Mother Earth." For
example, one tribe considers the Earth to have the persona of an attractive young man; another
tribe considers the Earth to be a disagreeable old man who cries and complains. See The Earth
as Mother in John Bierhorst, The Way of the Earth: Native America and the Environment 89
(William Morrow, 1994).
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erty4 -are forcing a growing number of Indian tribes to exchange the
spiritual view of their once pristine environment for a commercial
one. This shift from nurturing nature to exploiting the environment
on a growing number of reservations results largely from a legal
loophole that permits nonnatives to pollute inside Indian country in
ways they could not elsewhere.
States that neighbor reservations 6  are virtually
powerless to regulate environmentally hazardous activities
on tribal land-even when the ramifications of such activities
spill outside Indian country. Tribal sovereignty shields
reservations and Indians belonging to tribes 7 from the reach
4. The poverty rate among Indians is considerably higher than the national poverty rate
for all races. In 1980, 23.7% of Indians lived below the poverty level, compared with 11.7% of all
citizens and 9% of whites. Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1991 Tables 43-44 (U.S.
Bureau of the Census, 111th ed. 1991). Studies have linked the high poverty level on
reservations to the enhanced alcohol and drug addiction rates on many reservations. For
example, the alcoholism death rate among Indians in 1988 was 5.4 times higher than the
national death rate for all races. See Daniel J. Anderson, Indian Community Attacks a
Continuing Problem, Star Trib. 3E (Aug. 9, 1994).
5. For Title 18 criminal actions, Congress has defined "Indian country" as:
(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the
United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, including
rights-of-way running through the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian communities
within the borders of the United States whether within the original or subsequently ac-
quired territory thereof, and whether within or without the limits of a state, and (c) all
Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished, including
rights-of-way running through the same.
18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1988).
Although technically this statutory definition of Indian country governs only the application
of federal criminal laws over tribal territory, the Supreme Court generally has adopted this
definition when resolving civil matters as well. See, for example, California v. Cabazon Band of
Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 207 n.5 (1987) (stating the Section 1151 definition of Indian
country applies to both civil and criminal jurisdiction questions); DeCoteau v. District County
Court, 420 U.S. 425, 427 n.2 (1975) (noting that although Title 18 "on its face" applies only to
criminal jurisdiction, the Section 1151 definition "generally applies" to questions of civil juris-
diction as well). For extensive discussions on when land properly is considered part of Indian
country, see generally Felix S. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 27-46 (Michie Bobbs-
Merrill, 1982); Nicholas J. Spaeth, ed., American Indian Law Deskbook 35-38 (U. of Colo., 1993).
6. Thirty-four states house Indian reservations within their borders. See Robert
Famighetti, ed., The World Almanac and Book of Facts 434 (World Almanac Books, 1994).
7. In the legal context, an individual is an "Indian" if he or she establishes two criteria:
(1) the individual's ancestors lived in the land the United States now occupies before Europeans
discovered the continent (the Indian blood requirement); and (2) a tribe or Indian community
recognizes the individual to be an Indian. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law at 20 (cited
in note 5) (interpreting Ex parte Pero, 99 F.2d 28, 31 (7th Cir. 1938)). See also United States v.
Rogers, 45 U.S. 567, 571-74 (1846) (denying a white man status as an Indian who, although he
was "adopted" by the Cherokee Indian Nation, did not meet the Indian blood requirement). This
is different from being an "Indian" in the ethnological sense that instead examines racial
composition more closely. The result of the legal definition is that courts might consider a
person who has never had any relations with an Indian tribe to nonetheless be an "Indian" if the
person has some Indian ancestry. See Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law at 19-27; Robert
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of most state laws.8 Accordingly,state and local statutes
regulating pollution usually do not apply to Indian reserva-
tions."
This legal loophole in the interstices of tribal sovereignty and
state environmental regulation creates both an incentive and a prob-
lem. The incentive is for industry to move onto reservations to avoid
increasingly stringent state regulations,1 and for tribes to welcome
industry as a means of remedying economic woes. The problem af-
fects states when activities inside the reservations' borders threaten
the environment and natural resources outside the tribes' boundaries.
Perhaps nowhere is this incentive/problem scenario as evident
as in southern California, where 100,000 people fear that the state's
lack of authority to regulate the tribal environment will destroy their
drinking water." Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt recently approved
a six-hundred-acre landfill on the 16,000-acre Campo Indian
Reservation seventy miles east of San Diego that will collect daily
some three thousand tons of garbage for thirty years. 12 It also will
provide the tribe with approximately $1.62 million per year in earn-
ings, and eliminate the tribe's severe unemployment. 3 While the
business prospect of being home to the nation's largest landfill 4 might
come as a blessing to the tribe's members, the 100,000 people who
drink from an aquifer beneath the landfill site are not rejoicing.' s
N. Clinton, Criminal Jurisdiction Over Indian Lands: A Journey Through a Jurisdictional
Maze, 18 Ariz. L. Rev. 503, 513-21 (1976).
8. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 561 (1832) (describing the Cherokee nation as "a
distinct community occupying its own territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which
[state laws] can have no force . . . but with the assent of the Cherokees themselves, or in
conformity with treaties, and with the acts of congress"); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 219-20
(1959) (finding that state law applies to reservations only when "essential tribal relations" are
not involved and when the state law does not infringe on the "right of reservation Indians to
make their own laws and be ruled by them"). See notes 49-50 and accompanying text; Part
III.B.
9. See Washington Dep't of Ecology v. United States, 752 F.2d 1465, 1467-68 (9th Cir.
1985) (refusing to apply inside Indian country state hazardous waste regulations that were
enacted "in lieu of" a federal regulatory program). See text accompanying notes 124-29.
10. Although usually federal laws of general applicability apply inside Indian country, see
note 48, state laws may be stricter than federal regulations in two situations: (1) when states
enact standards more stringent than those required by the federal government; and (2) when
states enact statutes regulating areas that the federal statutes currently ignore.
11. Philip J. LaVelle, County Suit Seeks to Stop Landfill Proposed for Campo Reservation,
San Diego Union-Trib. B-3 (July 3, 1993).
12. Bill Lambrecht, Indians to Get Special Advocate on Environment, St. Louis Post-
Dispatch 1A (April 29, 1993).
13. Julie Tamaki, Pressure Mounts Against Dump, L.A. Times B1 (April 7, 1992).
14. Rogers Worthington, Tribes Resist Tempting Landfill Offers, Chi. Trib. C4 (Sept. 22,
1991).
15. Groundwater flows along distinct routes beneath the surface of the ground similar to
the way surface water flows in a stream. Therefore, pollutants leaking into groundwater under
1866 [Vol. 47:1863
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They fear the landfill operator's immunity from California's tighter
regulation and monitoring procedures inevitably will contaminate
their wells.16
This Note focuses on the states' vulnerability to environmen-
tally dangerous activities conducted in Indian country as a result of
the states' inability to enforce their environmental statutes against
Indian reservations. Part II describes the scope of the environmental
problem resulting from this legal loophole. Part III shows that, be-
cause of tribal sovereignty and the current jurisprudence surrounding
that doctrine, states likely will face significant obstacles in front of
efforts to control the environment on reservations. Part IV proposes
two potential solutions to this problem-one judicial and one legisla-
tive-and concludes that the legislative response is preferable. Part V
expands on this legislative solution by offering a model Congressional
statute drawing upon other acts that waive tribal sovereignty and
grant states regulatory authority over tribes in limited situations.
This Note concludes that the best solution is for Congress to close the
loophole and enact a statute similar to the one proposed.
II. A DISTRESSED SITUATION ON PRISTINE LANDS
"Indian land is the easiest place in the world to dump your wastes."
Ward Stone, Wildlife Pathologist
for New York state17
Despite the common belief that Indian reservations contain
much of the nation's most pristine and pure regions of land, the envi-
ronmental situation on many, if not most, reservations is distressed. 8
a reservation can travel under a tribe's borders and pollute the wells-or aquifers--of
communities outside the reservation.
16. Worthington, Chicago Tribune at C4 (cited in note 14).
17. Bill Lambrecht, Illegal Dumpers Scar Indian Land . . . Indifference Endangers
Reservations, St. Louis Post-Dispatch 11A (Nov. 17, 1991).
18. The Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") estimates that the condition of
environmental regulation and control on reservations is at least 20 years behind that of the
states. "Some of the worst environmental problems in the country are on Indian reservations.
Indians don't have the money to address the problems, and they don't have the technical
expertise." John Harmon, Environmental Plight of Reservations Spurs Indians, EPA to Seek
Solutions, Atlanta Journal-Constitution A3 (May 20, 1992) (quoting Roderick Ariwite,
administrator of the National Tribal Environmental Council). The problems arose during the
past three decades as Indian tribes lacking sufficient capital worked to entice industry onto
their reservations. Id. Although the reservations technically fell under federal regulations, only
in the late 1980s did the EPA begin to take a direct role in Indian affairs regarding clean-up and
1994] 1867
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One of the nation's politicians has described the situation as "Dances
with Garbage."'
19
Today, the nation's approximately three hundred Indian
reservations 20 serve as homes to mammoth oil refineries, strip
mining2' and forestry operations, toxic waste dumps, hazardous waste
recycling centers, and agricultural waste incinerators, among scores
of other types of heavy industrial activities and factories. 22 Both
geologically and geographically, these operations have been
particularly well suited to Indian reservations. Miners and refiers
viewed tribal lands as attractive because many reservations contain
vast natural resources-including large stores of petroleum and
precious minerals-as well as residents desperate for money. Landfill
and incinerator operators traditionally liked Indian country because
of its frequent isolation and the sparse population of most reserva-
tions.
Ironically, the increasingly stringent environmental regula-
tions that state governments have imposed during the past several
decades have made a bad situation on Indian reservations even
worse.23 Under the doctrine of tribal sovereignty, states have limited
enforcement. Id. Furthermore, Congress mistakenly omitted Indians from most environmental
laws passed in the early 1970s. Although Congress corrected most of these errors in the mid-
1980s, severe environmental problems had already surfaced on most reservations. Id. See also
William W. Quinn, Jr., Federal Environmental and Indian Law Confluent, 29 Ariz. Att'y 19
(Dec. 1992); Bill Lambrecht, Indians Say EPA Not Doing Enough, St. Louis Post-Dispatch 8A
(Nov. 18, 1991).
19. Lauren Ina, Sioux Debate Whether to Use 'Mother Earth' for Waste Dump, Wash. Post
A3 (Aug. 24, 1991) (quoting Sen. Thomas A. Daschle (D-S.D.)).
20. Currently, the federal government recognizes 287 Indian reservations. The 1994
Information Please Almanac 683 (Houghton Mifflin, 47th ed.).
21. For example, as a result of lead and silver mining on the Couer d'Alene Reservation,
some of the tribal land is considered to be among the worst polluted sites on the planet and
would require $1 billion to clean up. Bill Lambrecht, President Meets with Top Indians; Health,
Pollution are Issues at First Summit Since 1892, St. Louis Post-Dispatch 3A (April 30, 1994).
22. Furthermore, activities of Indians incidental to everyday life create environmental
hazards in ways that likely would not occur if regulated by states. For example, the EPA has
determined that septic systems on reservations are generally in very poor condition and often
discharge waste directly into lakes and fields. Tom Meersman, Indians Struggle Against
'Environmental Racism', Star Trib. 1A (Sept. 12, 1993). Smaller landfills serving the needs of
the tribes usually are scattered, open dumps not controlled or monitored for pollution. Id. In
1991, two of 108 tribal-operated landfills met federal standards. Id.
23. The problem of Indian reservations housing society's broader environmental problems
is analogous to the "environmental racism!' or "environmental discrimination" phenomenon
plaguing an increasing number of the nation's minority communities. It has become evident
during the past decade that, compared to white neighborhoods, minority neighborhoods are
bearing a disproportionately large environmental burden. See Edward Patrick Boyle, Note, It's
Not Easy Bein' Green: The Psychology of Racism, Environmental Discrimination, and the
Argument for Modernizing Equal Protection Analysis, 46 Vand. L. Rev. 937, 967 (1993). For
example, one report discovered that in Houston, Texas, seven of eight city-operated waste
incinerators are located in predominantly black areas, as are all of the five city-owned landfills.
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authority over Indian lands with regard to regulating pollution and
other environmental conditions inside Indian country.24 A state
possesses little more authority to control pollution on a neighboring
reservation than it has to prevent Canadian sulfur dioxide emissions
from causing acid rain or Mexican factories from polluting ground-
water that reaches the United States. As a result, nonnatives use the
borders and boundaries of Indian tribes as shields against strict
state25 environmental regulations and taxes on dumping, giving in-
dustry more incentive than ever to move onto reservations.26
Examples of nonnatives moving onto reservations to conduct
activities that states otherwise would prohibit have been plentiful
since the mid-1980s. For example, a member of the Onondaga Tribe
in 1991 charged a sandblaster fifty dollars to deposit tons of "black
beauty"2 7 on his land that the generating company otherwise would
have had to pay $25,000 to bury properly in a landfill.28 A garbage
Id. at 969 (citing Toxic Wastes and Race in the United States (United Church of Christ
Commission for Racial Justice, 1987)). Recently, the effectiveness of the movement to correct
the environmental discrimination problem was questioned after the NAACP dismissed its
director-the person who coined the term "environmental racism" more than a decade
ago-Benjamin F. Chavis, Jr. Marianne Lavelle, Greens and Companies Lose Leader, 17 Natl
L. J. Al (Sept. 5, 1994). Part of the reason for his dismissal is thought to concern the NAACP's
collaboration with industry groups to block the reauthorization of the Superfund program. Id.
For discussions of the environmental racism problem and suggested solutions, see generally
Boyle, 46 Vand. L. Rev. 937; Carolyn M. Mitchell, Environmental Racism: Race as Primary
Factor, 12 Nat'l Black L. J. 176 (1993); Pamela Duncan, Environmental Racism: Recognition,
Litigation, and Alleviation, 6 Tul. Envtl. L. J. 317 (1993); Symposium, Race, Class, and
Environmental Regulation, 63 U. Colo. L. Rev. 839 (1992).
24. See Part III.B.
25. Federal environmental laws of general applicability apply with equal force in Indian
country as they do to the states. See note 48.
26. The problem described here is not imited to Indian tribes within the borders of the
United States-it is a problem also experienced on a more global scope between industrialized
and developing nations. Industrialized countries increasingly send waste to developing nations
to avoid local opposition to landfills and because of a shortage of space for dumps. See Clare
Nullis, Conference Bans All Toxic Waste Exports, AP Worldstream (March 25, 1994) (available
on LEXIS, News library, Curnws file). Some 90% of waste exports include mercury waste, lead,
acid batteries, and plastics that give off noxious fumes when burned. Id. Many developing
nations desperate for cash accept the shipments. Id. Despite the fact that some countries in
Africa and Central America imposed formal bans on such waste, the governments lack the
resources to block many of the shipments. Id.
In early 1994, a United Nations-sponsored conference banned all exports of toxic waste from
industrialized to developing countries that will take effect Dec. 31, 1997. Id. Although 60
nations agreed to the prohibition, the United States attended the conference as an observer
rather than a participant and has not yet ratified the earlier Basel Convention on the
Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes. Id.
27. Black beauty is granular lead-filled material left over after sandblasting bridges.
28. Lambrecht, St. Louis Post-Dispatch at 11A (cited in note 17). Problems on the
Onondaga Indian Nation are so severe that the Onondaga Council of Chiefs has created its own
24-hour patrol aimed at blocking nonnatives from dumping on the reservation. See Roger
Martella, Jr., Onondagas Battle Dumping on Reservation, Syracuse Post-Standard Bi (June 4,
1991).
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hauler in southern California dumped waste on several tribal
reservations in the state because state standards classified the refuse
as hazardous, while federal standards imposed on the tribe regarded
it non-hazardous. 29 One tribe charges the same hauler seventy-five
dollars to dump twenty tons of automobile shredder waste-radically
less than the $1,600 a typical state-regulated dump outside the
reservation would charge.3 0  A Pittsburgh waste disposal firm
negotiated with a California tribe to build a dump on the tribe's land
that the state would have denied outside the reservation. The
company failed to follow the state's planning standards for closure of
the dump and for monitoring the dump thirty years after closure.3'
And in what might have been the most egregious result of this legal
loophole, the Choctaw tribe in Mississippi considered buying 466
acres from a landfill company in order to lease it back to the waste
disposal company for the development of a landfill immune from state
regulations. 32
Moreover, private industry is not the only group taking advan-
tage of this loophole. The federal government is offering to pay any
tribe willing to accept nuclear waste millions of dollars a year, despite
any objections from the states that border volunteering tribes.33
Although many tribes have resisted the temptation of generat-
ing revenue at the cost of degrading their environment,34 other tribes
29. Larry B. Stammer and Louis Sahagun, Profits vs. Toxics; Indian Land Opening to City
Wastes, LA. Times 1 (Sept. 26, 1987).
30. Id.
31. Ralph Frammolino and Amy Wallace, Landfill Lease on Indian Land Has
Substandard Controls, L.A. Times B1 (April 14, 1991).
32. Ronald Smothers, Future in Mind, Choctaws Reject Plan for Landfill, N.Y. Times 22
(April 21, 1991). Although the tribe backed away from the deal at the last minute, id., it is
foreseeable that this scenario could be played out regularly in the future. Indeed,
Massachusetts is taking advantage of tribal sovereignty in the gaming context to help one of the
state's struggling cities prosper. There, the City of New Bedford is seeking approval of a plan to
sell the city's golf course to the Wampanoag Indian Tribe. The tribe would then open a casino
and a 40-acre theme park on the land-a project that would create 5,000 to 7,000 jobs. Megg
Vaillancourt and Mitchell Zuckoff, Ante Upped on Casino Deal; Legislators Want a Say on
Details, Boston Globe 1 (Aug. 24, 1994). Under the proposed deal, the tribe would pay the State
and county a share of its gambling revenue in exchange for the exclusive right to operate a
casino in eastern Massachusetts. Id. Said the state's Governor, William Weld: 'This deal is
truly a win-win, a sure bet.... The Tribe stands to gain economically [and the complex will
bring] a much-needed jolt to the southeastern Massachusetts economy." Id.
33. Matthew C. Wald, Nuclear Storage Divides Apaches and Neighbors, N.Y. Times A18
(Nov. 11, 1993).
34. A further problem is caused by the fact that sometimes a tribe might lack the power to
control illegal polluting inside its lands. For example, Indians at the Torres-Martinez Indian
Reservation recently blocked for a week sewage shipments to a composting operation that began




view the legal loophole as an economic windfall. At a minimum, most
landfills operating on reservations can bring at least $1 million an-
nual revenue to a tribe and provide a quick solution to the unemploy-
ment and poverty problems plaguing tribes for generations.
Recognizing this, the chief of the Campo Indian Reservation has indi-
cated that his tribe is welcoming the 600-acre landfill that will oper-
ate on the reservation for the next three decades. 35
The problem of loosely regulated activities on Indian reserva-
tions impacting neighboring states is one that already has been real-
ized. Two months after a private hauler opened a landfill on a
California reservation, a fire broke out in the waste, sending a cloud
of thick smoke over a nearby town.36 An EPA report said it was un-
known whether the ash was hazardous, and feared dioxins-the most
hazardous chemical known-might have been left lingering in the
town.37
Although treating reservations as islands within states might
create economic benefits for reservations, this treatment also creates
problems for neighboring states. The problem is that from a geologi-
cal perspective, reservations are not islands. Environmental prob-
lems do not recognize political boundaries-states share groundwater,
surface water, air, wildlife, and other natural resources with reserva-
tions. However, state statutes aimed at protecting and regulating
such resources cease application at the borders of Indian tribes. As a
result, unregulated environmental threats on tribal land also endan-
ger those who live outside Indian country.38
35. For a description of the proposed Campo landfill, see text accompanying notes 11-16.
Said Campo Tribal Chairman Ralph Goff: "It's an economic development project for the tribe. It
will provide education, health, housing, the whole bit.... It's a priority, a very important pro-
ject." LaVelle, San Diego Union-Trib. at B-3 (cited in note 11). And the Campos are clearly not
alone. In support of a proposal to build a 954,000-acre solid waste dump on the Sioux
reservation in South Dakota-the tribe depicted in the movie "Dances with Wolves"--tribal
President Ralph Moran cited the assistance that such a landfill could bring to the tribe's 17,000
members and its 85% unemployment rate: "People still think we live in teepees and have
spotted horses. They have to wake up. We may not be a part of white society, but we certainly
want all the same things they do." Ina, Wash. Post at A3 (cited in note 19).
36. See Stammer and Sahagun, L.A. Times at 1 (cited in note 29).
37. See id.
38. This problem would occur, for example, if pollution from an unregulated landfill on a
reservation leached into the aquifer under the landfill and then crossed the reservation's border
underground, polluting the state's drinking supply. In another example, a state's effort to
cleanse a river could be frustrated entirely if the river meanders only briefly through a
reservation that houses a factory dumping pollution into the stream.
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III. TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY AND STATE POLLUTION LAWS
A balance must be struck. Although it is important to recog-
nize the long-established policies behind tribal sovereignty, particu-
larly the notion that tribes should be able to govern themselves and
dictate their own destiny without undue interference from the gov-
ernment, 9 a company or individual should not be permitted to pollute
in a way that jeopardizes a state's natural resources merely because
the pollution occurs on the opposite side of some invisible line.40 Yet,
under current law evolving out of the tribal sovereignty doctrine, it is
unclear and even unlikely that states have the power to prevent such
pollution and harm to their environments.
A. The Tribal Sovereignty Doctrine and its Rationale
Indian tribes retain sovereignty 4i over both their members and
their territory.42 Chief Justice John Marshall expressed the founda-
tion for the tribal sovereignty doctrine when he described tribes as
independent political communities. 43 Justice Marshall's view of
39. See Part IIlA.
40. See note 38 and accompanying text.
41. "Sovereignty" has been defined as:
The supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable power by which any independent state is
governed; ... the international independence of a state, combined with the right and
power of regulating its internal affairs without foreign dictation; ... The power to do
everything in a state without accountability,--to make laws, to execute and to apply
them, to impose and collect taxes and levy contributions, to make war or peace, to form
treaties of alliance or of commerce with foreign nations, and the like.
Black's Law Dictionary 1396 (West, 6th ed. 1990).
42. United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975) (stating that Indian tribes are
"unique aggregations possessing attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their
territory... [and] are 'a separate people' possessing 'the power of regulating their internal and
social relations").
43. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 559 (justifying the tribal sovereignty doctrine on the ground that
Indians retain their "original natural rights, as the undisputed possessors of the soil, from time
immemorial").
Treating Indian tribes as sovereigns evolves out of the recognition that most tribes were
independent, self-governing societies before Europeans discovered the continent. See Cohen,
Handbook of Federal Indian Law at 229 (cited in note 5). The tribal sovereignty doctrine that
Justice Marshall established flows from the governing powers that tribes exercised before the
territorial boundaries of the United States were established. Id. In arguing why the tribes
retained sovereignty upon being discovered by the more powerful European nations, the Chief
Justice applied concepts of international law and concluded that the United States adopted the
role of "protector" over the tribes rather than one of conqueror:
['Jhe settled doctrine of the law of nations is, that a weaker power does not surrender
its independence-its right to self government, by associating with a stronger, and tak-
ing its protection. A weak state, in order to provide for its safety, may place itself under
1872
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Indian tribes as independent "domestic dependent nations"44 that
should govern themselves free from intrusion by the states remains
the foundation of the tribal sovereignty doctrine today. 5 In fact, the
importance of recognizing a tribe's right to govern itself serves as the
"backdrop" of the sovereignty doctrine.46 It is against this backdrop
that courts consider whether states have authority to regulate a tribe.
The tribal sovereignty doctrine carries with it several ramifica-
tions for the regulatory powers of tribal, federal, and state govern-
ments. First, tribes possess the right "to make their own laws and be
ruled by them" without interference from the states.47 Second, tribal
the protection of one more powerful, without stripping itself of the right of government,
and ceasing to be a state.
Worcester, 31 U.S. at 560-61. See also Robert G. McCoy, The Doctrine of Tribal Sovereignty, 13
Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 357, 360-69 (1978).
44. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1831). In Cherokee Nation, decided
during the term prior to Worcester, Chief Justice Marshall acknowledged that the federal
government already had recognized Indian tribes as "states" whose relation to "the United
States resembles that of a ward to his guardian." Id. As a result, Marshall believed the federal
government has a strong interest in protecting tribes from attempts to jeopardize their
sovereignty:
[Indian tribes] look to our government for protection; rely upon its kindness and its
power; appeal to it for relief to their wants; and address the president as their great fa-
ther. They and their country are considered by foreign nations, as well as by ourselves,
as being so completely under the sovereignty and dominion of the United States, that
any attempt to acquire their lands, or to form a political connexion with them, would be
considered by all as an invasion of our territory, and an act of hostility.
Id. at 17-18.
45. See, for example, United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978) (recognizing that
Indian tribes "still possess those aspects of sovereignty not withdrawn by treaty or statute, or by
implication as a necessary result of their dependent status"). Although the United States to
some extent-and perhaps to a great extent-has limited the powers of tribes to regulate
themselves, the Constitution, statutes, judicial decisions, administrative practices, and treaties
all explicitly recognize tribal rights to retain powers of self-government. See Cohen, Handbook
of Federal Indian Law at 231 (cited in note 5). Furthermore, a trust relationship between the
United States and tribes evolving out of Cherokee Nation imposes a fiduciary duty on the United
States to protect each tribe's status as a self-governing entity. See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at
16-20. See generally Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law at 220-28.
46. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973). The Court in
McClanahan said that the tribal sovereignty doctrine provides a "backdrop" against which
courts must analyze how federal statutes and treaties protect Indians against interference from
state laws. Id. In describing this "backdrop," the Court stated: "It must always be remembered
that the various Indian tribes were once independent and sovereign nations, and that their
claim to sovereignty long predates that of our own Government." Id. See also White Mountain
Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143 (1980) (stating that "traditional notions of Indian
self-government are so deeply engrained in our jurisprudence that they have provided an
important 'backdrop'. ..against which vague or ambiguous federal enactments must always be
measured') (quoting McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 172).
47. New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 332 (1983) (quoting
McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 171-72). Although the New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe Court
said a state may not infringe on the right of tribes to make their own laws and emphasized that
tribes and their reservation lands are 'Insulated in some respects" from state and local control
because of a "historic immunity," the Court stated that sovereignty does not shield reservations
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sovereignty remains subordinate to Congress' plenary power.48 Third,
and most relevant in this context, a presumption exists that states
lack regulatory powers over tribes49 unless Congress explicitly grants
such power.50
from actions "inconsistent with the overriding interests of the National Government." Id.
(quoting Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 152 (1973) and Washington v.
Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 153 (1980)).
48. See, for example, Washington v. Confederated Tribes, 447 U.S. at 154 (recognizing that
'tribal sovereignty is dependent on, and subordinate to, only the Federal Government, not the
States'); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978) (acknowledging that Congress
has plenary power to "limit, modify or eliminate" a tribe's powers of self-government).
The Court also has held that absent a treaty or federal statute to the contrary, Indian tribes
are subject to federal laws of general applicability. See Federal Power Corm'n v. Tuscarora
Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 116 (1960) (stating that it is "now well settled" that federal statutes
of general applicability apply to Indians and their property interests). This rule enables federal
environmental statutes such as the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401 et seq. (1988 and Supp.
1992), and the Comprehensive Environmental Recovery, Compensation and Liability Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 9601 et seq. (1988 and Supp. 1992), to apply with equal force to reservations as they
do to states and non-Indian individuals. However, deciding whether a particular federal statute
applies to a reservation is not always as straightforward as the black letter law indicates and
may involve an analysis of Congress' intent. See Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law at
282-86 (cited in note 5); B. Kevin Gover and Jana L. Walker, Tribal Environmental Regulation,
36 Fed. B. News & J. 438 (1989). For specific discussions of how the Clean Air Act, the Clean
Water Act, 32 U.S.C. §§ 1251 et seq. (1988 and Supp. 1993), the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 690 et seq. (1988 and Supp. 1992), and the National Environmental
Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 et seq. (1988), apply to Indian reservations, see Quinn, 29 Ariz.
Att'y at 20-21 (cited in note 18). For a survey of how various federal environmental statutes
treat Indian tribes, see Judith V. Royster and Rory SnowArrow Fausett, Control of the
Reservation Environment: Tribal Primacy, Federal Delegation, and the Limits of State
Intrusion, 64 Wash. L. Rev. 581, 619-24 (1989).
49. When states attempt to regulate conduct on reservations involving Indians directly,
courts generally will hold the state law inapplicable. See, for example, White Mountain Apache
Tribe, 448 U.S. at 144 (noting that "[w]hen on-reservation conduct involving only Indians is at
issue, state law is generally inapplicable, for the State's regulatory interest is likely to be mini-
mal and the federal interest in encouraging tribal self-government is at its strongesD; New
Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. at 331-32 (recognizing that only "in exceptional
circumstances a State may assert jurisdiction over the on-reservation activities of tribal mem-
bers"); United States v. Harvey, 701 F.2d 800, 805 (9th Cir. 1983) (declining to apply state traffic
safety laws to Indians inside a reservation). See Part III.B.1.
Yet, when a state attempts to assert regulatory authority over non-Indians operating
activities inside a reservation, the presumption that the state law fails to apply is weaker than
when a state attempts to regulate Indians only. See, for example, New Mexico v. Mescalero
Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. at 331 (stating that a state may assert authority over activities of non-
natives on reservations in "certain circumstances" compared to the "exceptional circumstances"
required when the state attempts to assert authority over tribal members). In such situations,
courts make a "particularized inquiry into the nature of the state, federal, and tribal interests at
stake." White Mountain Apache Tribe, 448 U.S. at 145. Compare id. at 145-51 (declining to
apply a state tax to a normative business engaged in timber activities on a reservation because
imposing the tax would interfere adversely with the tribe's and the federal government's
interests) with Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of Flathead Reservation, 425
U.S. 463, 481-83 (1976) (holding state cigarette sales tax applicable to on-reservation sales to
non-tribal members, but not to sales to reservation members). See Part III.B.2.
At the same time, tribal sovereignty contains a "significant geographical component" such
that off-reservation activities of Indians generally are subject to nondiscriminatory state regu-
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Therefore, before a state can enforce an environmental regula-
tion on a reservation, it must overcome the presumption that the
regulation would interfere with the protected rights of tribes to gov-
ern themselves under the tribal sovereignty doctrine.51 When consid-
ering whether a state has met its burden to defeat the sovereignty
presumption, courts apply the infringement-preemption test.
B. The Infringement-Preemption Test
The established analysis for whether a state may enforce its
laws on a reservation is the infringement-preemption test.52 The test
balances the competing tribal, federal government, and state interests
in deciding whether state law applies.53
In theory, preemption and infringement analyses operate in-
dependently as bars to state law enforcement on a reservation."
lations in the absence of express federal law to the contrary. New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache
Tribe, 462 U.S. at 335 n.18 (quoting Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. at 148-49).
50. Congress can waive tribal sovereignty and allow states to regulate reservations in
particular areas. See, for example, 25 U.S.C. § 231(2) (1988) (granting states power to enforce
compulsory school attendance laws against Indian children and their parents) (described in note
169); Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(3)(C) (requiring that tribes negotiate
with neighboring states how certain aspects of casino operation will be regulated); 18 U.S.C. §
1162(a) (1988) (granting certain states civil and criminal jurisdiction over tribes).
51. Although the legal definition of sovereignty is the relevant definition that courts apply
when considering the authority of a state to regulate a tribe, it is helpful also to consider sover-
eignty as explained by the people who have the most interest in making sure the word is
described accurately-Indians themselves:
Personally I'm sovereign. I'm not dependent on anybody. For thirteen years I was a
high-steel construction man. I did that very well and I loved it. It satisfied something
in my ego and my manhood. But then, after I'd put up hundreds of towers and sky-
scrapers and bridges, I looked around and saw that no skyscrapers were being built on
the reservation. I said, "Hey, this ain't doin' my people any good." So I climbed down off
the iron and picked up the flag of self-determination. Then I had to learn how to make
my family sovereign, how to make my people sovereign. Sovereignty is something that
goes in ever-widening circles, beginning with yourself. In order for Indian people to at-
tain sovereignty, each of us has to be sovereign in ourselves. If a person can go out into
the stream and fish for their needs, if they can do whatever they have to do to provide
for those who are dependent on them, then that person is sovereign. Sovereignty isn't
something someone gives you. You can't give us our sovereignty. Sovereignty isn't a
privilege someone gives you. It's a responsibility you carry inside yourself. In order for
my people to achieve sovereignty, each man and woman among us has to be sovereign.
Sovereignty begins with yourself.
Eddie Benton-Banai, of the Ojibway Tribe, quoted in Wall and Arden, Wisdomkeepers at 51
(cited in note 3).
52. See White Mountain Apache Tribe, 448 U.S. at 142-44.
53. See, for example, New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. at 330-43 (refusing
to apply to a reservation state fish and wildlife regulations that conflicted with tribal regula-
tions because such an application would interfere with tribal and federal interests without
promoting any justifiable state interests).
54. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 448 U.S. at 142-43.
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First, federal law may preempt state law from operating against a
tribe.5 5 Second, state law may be blocked if it unlawfully infringes "on
the right of Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them.'' 6
Yet, in practice, courts today apply only the preemption test in decid-
ing whether state law applies on a reservation,57 and have abandoned
the infringement test as an independent consideration.58
The preemption test in this context is one unique to Indian law
and is not the traditional test that refers to federal preemption of
state statutes.59 Instead, the test for whether federal law preempts
state law in the Indian law context is whether applying the state
statute would interfere with the federal and tribal interests in pro-
moting tribal self-government that evolve from the tribal sovereignty
doctrine.6 A consideration of traditional tribal sovereignty interests
as the backdrop to this analysis is crucial.61 If the court finds a con-
55. Id. Although the test refers specifically to "federal" law preemption of state law, the
test incorporates the interests of the tribes-particularly the interest in tribal self-govern-
ment-into federal law through the "backdrop" principle discussed in note 46 and accompanying
text. See id. at 143 (stating that "[t]he tradition of Indian sovereignty over the reservation and
tribal members must inform the determination whether the exercise of state authority has been
pre-empted by operation of federal law"). The recognition of tribal interests in self-government
as the "backdrop" of the preemption analysis enables federal law to preempt state law, even
when Congress has not enacted a federal statute that specifically touches upon the relevant
issue. Id. at 143-44.
56. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. at 332-33.
57. See Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 718-24 (1983) (applying primarily the preemption
test while discussing the infringement test only briefly). See also Royster and Fausett, 64
Wash. L. Rev. at 601-02 (cited in note 48) (stating that courts currently apply "almost
exclusively" the federal preemption test in deciding whether tribal sovereignty blocks the
application of state law).
58. At the same time, the policy and considerations underlying the infringement test have
been incorporated into the preemption test. See Royster and Fausett, 64 Wash. L. Rev. at 601.
59. Id. The "traditional" preemption test referred to above is the test used to decide
whether the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution mandates that federal law preempt
state law. See generally John E. Nowak, and Ronald D. Rotunda, Constitutional Law ch. 9 (4th
ed., 1991) (discussing various preemption tests).
60. See Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. at 216. The test has been expressed
formally as:
"State jurisdiction is preempted ... if it interferes or is incompatible with federal and
tribal interests reflected in federal law, unless the state interests at stake are sufficient
to justify the assertion of state authority." The inquiry is to proceed in light of tradi-
tional notions of Indian sovereignty and the congressional goal of Indian self-govern-
ment, including its "overriding goal" of encouraging tribal self-sufficiency and economic
development.
Id. at 216 (quoting Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. at 334). The Court in Mescalero Apache
Tribe stated that courts, in applying the preemption test, traditionally have rejected a narrow
approach that focuses solely on Congressional intent or express Congressional statements that
state law should be preempted. 462 U.S. at 334. Instead, the question of whether a state has
regulatory authority over a reservation demands "a particularized inquiry into the nature of the
state, federal, and tribal interests at stake." Id. at 333. Part III.C discusses these various
interests as they relate specifically to environmental issues.
61. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. at 334. See notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
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flict between federal and state law, it will not apply the state law
unless the state's interests are so substantial that the intrusion is
justified.6 2  Among the interests to be balanced on the federal and
tribal side are the promotion of tribal self-government, economic
development, and self-sufficiency. 63
Although courts apply the infringement-preemption test to all
state statutes that seek to regulate activity on reservations, the man-
ner in which courts apply the test differs depending on whether the
state seeks to regulate tribal members directly or whether it only
seeks to regulate nonnative individuals" and enterprises on reserva-
tions.65
1. Regulation of Tribal Activities
When states seek to regulate Indians or Indian activities,66 a
presumption has emerged from the infringement-preemption test that
62. See id. at 341-43. The Mescalero Apache Tribe Court followed the typical procedure
courts have employed in applying the infringement-preemption test. There, New Mexico
attempted to enforce on a reservation a state statute that regulated hunting and fishing. Id. at
328-29. The state regulations either conflicted with, or were more restrictive than, the tribe's
regulations. Id. at 329. First, the Court found that enforcing the statute would interfere with
the tribe's authority to regulate its own resources as well as the federal government's interest in
encouraging tribal self-government and economic development. Id. at 338-41. Second, the
Court held that the state failed to "identify any regulatory function or service... that would
justify the assertion" of regulatory authority. Id. at 341. See also White Mountain Apache
Tribe, 448 U.S. 136 (holding that imposing a state tax on a reservation would undermine federal
objectives in administering tribal programs); Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202
(denying a state the ability to regulate on-reservation bingo games despite the state's interest in
preventing infiltration of organized crime).
63. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. at 216. See Part III.C for a discussion of
how these interests apply in the environmental law context.
64. Indians who are not members of a particular tribe are situated similarly to non-
Indians with respect to the authority of states to apply their regulations. See Washington v.
Confederated Tribes of Colville, 447 U.S. at 160-61.
65. In addition to the difference in analyses when a state seeks to regulate Indians versus
nonnatives, there are two other distinctions that are sometimes relevant in this context, yet
which are beyond the scope of this Note. First, a state generally has regulatory authority,
subject to several exceptions, over nonnative activities occurring on land inside a reservation
that nonnatives own in fee. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981); Royster
and Fausett, 64 Wash. L. Rev. at 598-99 (cited in note 48); Timothy R. Malone and Bradley B.
Furber, Regulatory Jurisdiction over Nonmembers' Land within Indian Reservations, 7 Nat.
Resources & Env't 14, 15 (Spring 1993). Second, certain states can enforce "prohibitory" stat-
utes inside Indian country pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1988) and 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1988),
which grant 11 states civil and criminal jurisdiction over certain Indian reservations. See
Royster and Fausett, 64 Wash. L. Rev. at 607-11.
66. In this context, a state seeks to regulate Indians when it attempts to apply a statute
either to Indians living inside Indian country or Indian enterprises conducted inside Indian
country. See, for example, McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 165 (1973)
(denying state authority to collect state income taxes from Navajo Indians with respect to
income derived completely from reservation sources).
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the state statute interferes with tribal sovereignty and is, therefore,
preempted.67 The rationale for this presumption is that when a state
attempts to regulate the on-reservation conduct of Indians, the state's
regulatory interests are likely to be minimal, while the federal inter-
est in encouraging tribal self-government is at its strongest.68 States
may rebut this presumption only in exceptional circumstances.69
To date, the Supreme Court has found the "exceptional circum-
stances" test met in only a handful of cases. In Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v.
Washington Game Dep't,70 the Court held that the state had authority
to regulate hunting, fishing, and gathering of wildlife on the reserva-
tion.71 The state was permitted to enforce on the reservation state
laws that were necessary for conserving the species72 At the same
time, the Court added that effective tribal self-regulation would pre-
empt state regulations.7
3
The Court also found the "exceptional circumstances" test met
in Rice v. Rehner.74 In Rice, the Court held state liquor license laws
applicable to retail establishments on reservations-including stores
operated by Indians75 The Court reasoned that Congress had di-
vested the Indians of any inherent power to regulate in this area by
enacting a federal statute76 that granted the state power to impose its
own liquor regulations on retailers.77
2. Regulation of Nonnative Activities
When states seek to regulate nonnatives and their activities
conducted inside Indian country,78 courts make a "particularized in-
quiry" into the nature of the state, federal and tribal interests at
stake rather than demand "exceptional circumstances" justifying the
67. Id. at 215 (recognizing that states may regulate on-reservation activities of natives
only "in exceptional circumstances").
68. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 448 U.S. at 144.
69. See id. See also Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. at 331-32.
70. 433 U.S. 165 (1977).
71. Id. at 176-77.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 178.
74. 463 U.S. 713 (1983).
75. Id. at 713.
76. See 18 U.S.C. § 1161 (1988).
77. Rice, 463 U.S. at 732-33.
78. In this context, a state seeks to regulate nonnatives and their activities conducted
inside Indian country when it attempts to apply a statute that is generally applicable to the
state's residents to nonnatives and their enterprises inside a reservation. See, for example,
Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 186-87 (1989) (allowing state authority to
collect severance taxes from on-reservation production of oil and gas by nonnative lessees).
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application of the state statute.7 9 The tribal interests flow primarily
from the well-established right of tribes to govern themselves
expressed in the "backdrop" of tribal sovereignty. 80 The federal
government retains strong interests in assuring that Indians are
benefited by the statutes it enacts; in protecting the tribes' rights to
govern themselves under the fiduciary relationship existing between
the tribes and the federal government; and in assuring that state
statutes do not interfere with comprehensive federal programs to
regulate Indian affairs.8' To tip the balance in favor of applying a
state regulation to nonnatives, the state must establish that imposing
the statute will serve a legitimate regulatory interest.8 2
The interplay among tribal, federal, and state interests that
arises when a state attempts to regulate nonnatives inside a
reservation is discussed in New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe.83
There, the Court denied the state authority to enforce wildlife gaming
laws against nonnatives hunting and fishing on the reservation. 84 The
tribe and federal government jointly had developed a comprehensive
scheme of regulations for such activities on the reservation.85
Although the state conceded that the tribe exercised exclusive
jurisdiction over hunting and fishing by tribal members, 86 it argued
that the tribe and state shared "concurrent jurisdiction" over
nonmembers that permitted the state to impose its own conditions on
nonnative hunting and fishing.8 7  New Mexico therefore sought to
impose on nonnatives regulations that were more strict in several
aspects than the tribe's regulations.$
The Court held that the state may exercise concurrent jurisdic-
tion on a reservation when the state's asserted authority is not
79. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 448 U.S. at 145.
80. See note 46 and accompanying text.
81. As a result of the federal government's obligation to protect a tribe's right of self-
government, federal law technically may preempt state law even though there is no federal
statute involved. See note 55.
82. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 448 U.S. at 141-45. See Part IIlA.
83. 462 U.S. 324.
84. The tribe had anticipated a decline in the sale of lumber from the reservation-its
largest income-producing activity-and constructed a resort complex for nonnative hunters and
fishermen. The federal government contributed substantially both to the funding for the resort
and the development of the reservation's fish and wildlife resources. Id. at 327-28.
85. Id. at 328-29. Such ordinances regulated, for example, bag limits and season dates.
Id.
86. Id. at 330.
87. Id.
88. For example, the tribe permitted a hunter to kill both a buck and a doe while the state
permitted a hunter to kill only a buck. Id. at 329.
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preempted by the operation of federal law.89 However, New Mexico's
exercise of such authority would have "effectively nullified" the tribe's
authority to control hunting and fishing by supplanting the tribal
regulations,9° thereby interfering with the tribe's right of self-govern-
ment. The Court emphasized the importance of allowing the tribe to
regulate hunting and fishing on the reservation; it found that tribal
ordinances reflected the specific needs of the reservation while state
laws were based on considerations possibly hostile to the tribe's
needs.91 Also, the Court said that concurrent jurisdiction would con-
flict with the federal government's interests in two ways: (1) it would
completely disrupt the comprehensive scheme of federal and tribal
management that federal law established;92 and (2) it would threaten
Congress' overriding objective of encouraging tribal self-government
and economic development.93
As for the state's interest in imposing its regulations, the
Court stated that a state's interests are strongest in two situations:
(1) when the state provides services in connection with the on-reser-
vation activity;94 and (2) when the state can point to off-reservation
effects that necessitate state intervention. 95 New Mexico established
neither. New Mexico had not contributed in any significant respect to
the maintenance of the tribe's wildlife resources. 96 It also could not
identify any off-reservation effects; some of the species never left the
reservation lands and the state could not identify any specific interest
89. Id. at 333.
90. Id. at 338 (stating that "It]he Tribe would thus exercise its authority over the reserva-
tion only at the sufferance of the State).
91. Id. at 339-40 (stating that "[p]ermitting the State to enforce different restrictions
simply because they have been determined to be appropriate for the State as a whole would
impose on the Tribe the possibly insurmountable task of ensuring that the patchwork applica-
tion of state and tribal regulations remains consistent with sound management of the reserva-
tion's resources'.
92. Id. at 339-40. The Court held that requiring tribal ordinances to yield to more re-
strictive state regulations would "undermine" the federal government's ability to make the
broad determinations committed to the federal government's authority. Id. at 340.
93. Id. at 341. The Court emphasized that giving the state regulatory authority in the
present case would be particularly disruptive because the situation was far removed from a
situation in which the tribal contribution to an enterprise was "de minimis," such as when on-
reservation sales outlets market to nonnatives goods not manufactured by the tribe or its
members. Id.
94. Id. at 336. The Court noted that any state regulation imposing additional burdens on
a tribal enterprise "must ordinarily be justified" by functions or services the state performs in
connection with the on-reservation activity. Id. This means a state seeking to tax a transaction
between a tribe and nonnatives must assert an interest stronger than a general interest in
raising revenue. Id.
95. Id. In such a situation, the Court said a state's regulatory interest will be
'"particularly strong." Id.
96. Id. at 341.
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in species that occasionally did leave tribal lands.9 7  The Court
concluded the tribe had sole authority to regulate the use of its
resources by members and nonmembers. 9
Similarly, in White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker,99 the
Court held that a state's general interest in raising revenue failed to
justify its attempt to tax non-Indian timber operations on a reserva-
tion.100 The Court recognized that the "backdrop" of the tribal sover-
eignty doctrine-particularly, the traditional notions encircling Indian
self-governmenti01--required the Court to examine closely the state's
asserted interest in imposing its law on reservation activities.102
Augmenting the tribe's interest in tribal sovereignty was the federal
government's interest in tribal economic development.10 3 Because the
state's imposition of a tax would interfere with both the tribe's10 4 and
the federal government's 05 interests, the Court required the state to
97. Id.
98. Id. at 343-44.
99. 448 U.S. 136 (1979).
100. Id. at 150. In White Mountain Apache Tribe, an enterprise consisting of two non-
Indian corporations felled tribal timber on the Fort Apache Reservation and transported it to
the tribe's sawmill, also on the reservation. State agencies attempted to impose the Arizona
motor carrier license and use-fuel taxes on the enterprise. Id. at 139-40. The enterprise argued
that federal law preempted the taxes and that the taxes represented an unlawful infringement
on tribal self-government. Id. at 138.
101. See Part III. The Court began its discussion of the line between state regulatory
authority and tribal self-government by establishing "several basic principles." White Mountain
Apache Tribe, 448 U.S. at 141. First, the Court stated that "the laws of [a State] can have no
force" inside a reservation's boundaries. Id. (quoting Worcester, 6 U.S. at 561). Second, the
Court stated that "Indian tribes retain 'attributes of sovereignty over both their members and
their territory."' White Mountain Apache Tribe, 448 U.S. at 142 (quoting Mazurie, 419 U.S. at
557).
102. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 448 U.S. at 144.
103. Id. at 143.
104. Apparently, the mere fact that the state attempted to assert authority over activities
operating on a reservation was enough to interfere with the tribe's interest in self government,
thereby triggering the "particularized inquiry" analysis. See generally id. at 142-44.
105. In the present case, the Court held that imposing the state tax would conflict with two
comprehensive federal schemes. First, the Court considered the federal government's "long
history" of regulating tribal timber, id. at 145 n.12, and that the regulation in its current form
was "comprehensive." Id. at 145. Specifically, the Court found that imposing the state taxes
would interfere with the federal government's interest by: (1) undermining the federal policy of
assuring that profits from timber sales benefit tribes; (2) interfering with the Secretary of the
Interior's discretion in setting fees and rates with respect to the harvesting and sale of timber;
and (3) adversely affecting the tribe's ability to comply with federally imposed harvesting poli-
cies. Id. at 149-50. Second, the Court said that the federal government's regulation of tribal
roads was also extensive. Id. at 147-48.
In all, the Court concluded that the federal regulatory scheme in both tribal timber opera-
tions and road regulations was "so pervasive as to preclude the additional burdens" the state
would impose through its taxes. Id. at 148. Imposing the taxes would "obstruct federal poli-
cies." Id. The fact that such a comprehensive scheme existed provided the most significant
support for the Court's holding that the state could not apply the tax: "[T]he fact that the
economic burden of the tax falls on the Tribe does not by itself mean that the tax is pre-empted.
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identify a legitimate regulatory interest in imposing its tax.106 The
Court concluded that the only interest the state could claim was a
generalized interest in raising revenue-an interest insufficient to
justify the intrusion into the tribe's and federal government's
interests.107
The Supreme Court has upheld efforts of states to tax on-res-
ervation activities of nonnatives when the state asserts a sufficiently
strong interest. In Cotton Petroleum Corporation v. New Mexico,0 8
the Court upheld the state's authority to tax the oil and gas produc-
tion of a nonnative enterprise that had leased lands on the Jicarilla
Apache Tribe Reservation.10 9 The Court held that states may tax on-
reservation oil production unless Congress expressly or impliedly has
prohibited such taxes."0 Perhaps the strongest factor supporting the
state tax was the fact that the state provided on-reservation services
to the company and the tribe."' The Court rejected the company's
argument that the federal government retained a strong interest in
ensuring that Indian tribes receive the greatest return from their oil
... Our decision today is based on the pre-emptive effect of the comprehensive federal
regulatory scheme, which ... leaves no room for the additional burdens sought to be imposed by
state law." Id. at 151 n.15.
106. Id. at 150. See also Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S.
685, 688-90 (1965) (rejecting the state's attempt to impose a gross proceeds tax on a normative
company that conducted a retail trading business on a reservation because the "comprehensive
federal regulation of Indian traders" prohibited the assessment of the attempted taxes).
107. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 448 U.S. at 150. The Court suggested that a state
might have a stronger interest if it sought to assess taxes in return for governmental functions
that it performed for those whom it sought to tax. Id.
108. 490 U.S. 163 (1989).
109. Id. at 186. The Court upheld the state's 8% severance tax while allowing the tribe to
continue imposing its 6% severance tax. Id. at 189.
110. Id. at 187. Analogizing to the situation when a state taxes a private party that does
business with the United States, the Court indicated that a state can impose a nondiscrimina-
tory tax on a private party with whom a tribe does business, even when the financial burden of
the tax falls on the tribe. Id. at 175. At the same time, Congress can exempt a tribe from state
taxation. Id.
Courts therefore analyze state efforts to tax normative oil and gas leasing activities in a
manner different from state efforts to regulate normative activities on reservations. In the
latter situation, federal law preempts state law in most situations, even when Congress has not
expressly or impliedly indicated that states lack authority to regulate a particular area. See
notes 83-107 and accompanying text.
111. Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 186. The District Court found the state spent approxi-
mately $3 million per year in providing on-reservation services both to the corporation and the
tribe, as well as off-reservation services that benefited the reservation and tribal members. Id.
at 172 n.7. The Court upheld the tax despite the fact that the revenues collected from the tax
were greater than the services the state provided. Id. at 172. Although the Court said this
discrepancy was the corporation's "most persuasive argument" against the tax, it found two
justifications for rejecting the argument: (1) the services the State provided were available to
the lessees and members of the tribe off the reservation as well as on it; and (2) no constitu-
tional provision required that benefits received from a taxing authority by a commercial tax-
payer equal the taxpayer's obligations. Id. at 189-90.
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and gas leases.112 Instead, it stated that in authorizing mineral leases
on reservations, Congress did not intend to remove all state-imposed
obstacles to profitability."3 As for the tribe's interest in sovereignty,
the Court reasoned that because states historically had imposed taxes
on nonnative oil and gas lessees, there was no history of tribal inde-
pendence from state taxation erecting a "backdrop" of sovereignty.114
Although the Supreme Court has not yet considered whether a
state may enforce its environmental laws on a reservation, the juris-
prudence flowing from the infringement-preemption test reveals that
states would lack the authority to regulate the environment of neigh-
boring reservations in many, if not most, circumstances.
C. State Environmental Protection Statutes under
the Infringement-Preemption Test
Under the infringement-preemption test,"5 states face signifi-
cant-and perhaps insurmountable-obstacles in front of attempts to
enforce their environmental regulations in Indian country.
Nonetheless, the height of these obstacles depends on whether a court
considers the regulation as a law applying to tribal activities or
nontribal activities conducted on reservation lands." 6
1. Regulation of Tribal Activities
If a court finds that a state's application of an environmental
statute inside a reservation serves to regulate the tribe itself or tribal
members,17 a presumption arises that the state is interfering with
112. Id. at 179. The Court downplayed the federal government's interest despite the fact
that, in the legislative history of the Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938 that authorized the
tribe's lease, Congress quoted the Interior Secretary stating that a purpose of the Act was to
give tribes "the greatest return from their property." Id. at 178-79.
113. Id. at 179-80 (stating that "a purpose of the 1938 Act is to provide Indian tribes with
badly needed revenue, but [the Court finds] no evidence for the further supposition that
Congress intended to remove all barriers to profit maximization").
114. Id. at 182. The Court concluded that the burden the tax imposed on the tribe was not
"substantial." Id. at 186.
115. The foregoing analysis assumes that federal law does not preempt the state statute in
the traditional sense in which a state statute conflicts with a federal statute. See note 59.
116. A state regulates tribal activities when it seeks to apply a statute to Indians inside a
reservation. A state regulates normative activities when it seeks to apply a statute only to
activities inside a reservation conducted by people other than the tribe's members. See notes 66
and 78.
117. The finding that a state is seeking to regulate Indians could arise in one of two situ-
ations: (1) when the state seeks to regulate activities conducted by tribal members such as a
landfill that serves the reservation; and (2) when the court classifies activities operated by non-
Indians as a tribal activity.
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tribal sovereignty. As a result, unless the state can demonstrate that
an exceptional circumstance exists in which its interests in regulating
the reservation environment outweigh tribal and federal interests,
federal law will preempt the state law.118
Under current tribal sovereignty jurisprudence, it is unlikely
that a court would allow a state to enforce an environmental
regulation on a reservation unless the state could establish clearly
that on-reservation activities were harming the off-reservation
environment to such a magnitude that an exceptional circumstance
exists. Although Puyallup Tribe, in which the Court granted a state
authority to regulate hunting and fishing on a reservation appears
applicable, 119 several factual differences likely would distinguish away
Puyallup Tribe's precedential value. Puyallup Tribe involved the
sharing of off-reservation fishing by native treaty fishermen and
nonnatives. 120 The fact that some of the fishing stations were actually
within Indian country was not realized until late in the litigation.' 21
Therefore, it is unclear whether the "exceptional circumstances" test
was met because the on-reservation activities threatened the
environment outside the tribe's boundaries or because the Court
discovered late in the litigation that the reservation in fact was being
regulated.
Similarly, the holding in Rice v. Rehner122 is not immediately
applicable to environmental situations because Congress has not
divested Indian tribes of authority to regulate their environments. In
contrast to Rice, most federal environmental statutes explicitly recog-
nize the authority of tribes to adopt their own implementation pro-
grams rather than participate in the neighboring state's programs.1 2
3
Furthermore, at least one court has held that a state's interest
in protecting the environment by regulating pollution inside Indian
country does not meet the "exceptional circumstances" test.124  In
Washington v. United States,2 5 the Ninth Circuit rejected the state's
argument that either the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 26
or federal authorization of the state's hazardous waste management
118. See Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. at 215-16. See also notes 66-69 and
accompanying text.
119. See notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. 463 U.S. 713 (1983).
123. See note 129.
124. Washington v. United States, 752 F.2d 1465, 1467-68 (9th Cir. 1985).
125. Id.
126. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901 et seq. (1988).
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plan entitled the state to implement its hazardous waste regulations
on reservations.127 In examining the tribal and federal interests at
stake,128 the court emphasized that states cannot interfere with the
federal government's interest in promoting tribal self-determination,
self-government, and self-regulation of environmental matters. 129
Despite the fact that the case law indicates that courts are not
likely to permit a state to enforce its environmental laws against
tribal members, the possibility remains that a court will hold that off-
reservation pollution flowing from on-reservation activity qualifies as
an "exceptional circumstance" justifying application of state law. For
example, a court might grant a state authority to regulate a tribe's
sewage treatment plant if it could prove that the plant's operations
were polluting the state's groundwater. At the same time, the state
likely would have to prove that enforcement of its regulations would,
in fact, resolve the environmental problem.
2. Regulation of Nonnative Activities
If a court finds that applying a state environmental law inside
a reservation serves to regulate nonnatives or non-Indian enterprises
on the reservation, the court will balance the tribal, federal, and state
interests by a particularized inquiry.130 Under this analysis, the state
will have only a slightly stronger chance of convincing the court to
permit application of its statute. Although the Supreme Court has
not performed this balancing test in a context in which on-reservation
activities by nonnatives threaten to pollute a state's environment, it
nonetheless remains unlikely the Court would allow a state to protect
its resources in such situations.
Tribes have a strong interest in self-regulation and self-
government that flows from the tribal sovereignty doctrine.13'
Protected as part of the "backdrop" of tribal sovereignty is a tribe's
127. Washington v. United States, 752 F.2d at 1471-72. Specifically, the court recognized
that "the sovereign role of the tribes... does not disappear when the federal government takes
responsibility for the management of a federal program on tribal lands." Id. at 1471.
128. Id. at 1471-72.
129. Id. As support for the federal government's interest in allowing tribes to regulate
their own environments, Washington v. United States cited the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §
7474(c), and the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136(u) (1988), as
two environmental statutes that grant tribes broad discretion to regulate their environment in
order to achieve federal goals. Id. at 1471.
130. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 448 U.S. at 144-45. See notes 99-107 and accompany-
ing text.
131. See Part IIIA.
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right to regulate the conduct of nonnatives inside Indian country.132
This right includes the power of both Indians and nonnatives to man-
age reservation territory and resources. 133 Furthermore, tribal inter-
ests in self-regulation are enhanced when the tribe seeks to protect
the health and welfare of the reservation3 or regulate the tribal
resources within Indian country.135 Finally, tribes retain strong inter-
ests in promoting economic development36 and tribal self-
sufficiency.
137
Cutting against the otherwise strong tribal interest in self
government is the fact that tribes frequently have no more than a de
minimis interest in nonnative activities conducted on their
reservations.13 8 Unlike the situation in Mescalero Apache Tribe, in
which the state sought to regulate an activity on the reservation
involving wildlife from the reservation, 3 9 a tribe has little self-interest
in, for example, a product that is made from raw materials brought
into the reservation, manufactured inside the reservation's borders,
and then shipped back outside the reservation for sale to
nonnatives.140
The interests of the federal government arise in two contexts:
(1) protecting tribal sovereignty; and (2) ensuring that state statutes
do not interfere with comprehensive federal regulatory schemes.
First, federal Indian policy is to promote tribal self-government and
protect tribal sovereignty.'4 ' Congress' "overriding" goal in promoting
such self-government is to enable tribes to achieve political and
132. See Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. at 333 (stating that "(a) tribe's power to exclude
nonmembers entirely or to condition their presence on the reservation is... well established").
See also notes 83-98 and accompanying text.
133. Id. at 335.
134. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. at 566. See Spaeth, American Indian Law
Deskbook at 272 (cited in note 5).
135. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. at 335-37. See Spaeth, American Indian Law
Deskbook at 272.
136. See authority cited in note 135.
137. Id.
138. See note 93.
139. See notes 83-98 and accompanying text.
140. For example, a tribe would have little interest in an activity that refined petroleum
mined outside the reservation and then shipped into states for consumption.
141. See, for example, Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. at 334-35 (stating that the federal
government is "firmly committed" to the goal of promoting tribal self-government). See also
Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 152 (1973) (stating that the purpose of the
Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. § 461 et seq. (1988), is to rehabilitate the tribes' "economic
life" and give them "a chance to develop the initiative destroyed by a century of oppression and
paternalism"); Indian Financing Act of 1974, 25 U.S.C. § 1451 (1988) (stating that the policy of
the Act is to develop and utilize Indian resources "to a point where the Indians will fully
exercise responsibility for the utilization and management of their own resources'). See also
Spaeth, American Indian Law Deskbook at 274 (cited in note 5).
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economic self-sufficiency. 42 This policy extends to the environmental
regulation arena.143 Second, the federal government has a strong
interest in assuring that state statutes do not obstruct the operation
of comprehensive federal regulatory schemes.144  Therefore, the
likelihood that courts will give state environmental statutes force
within reservations is diminished by the fact that the federal govern-
ment already has a strong presence in the environmental regulation
arena and its stated policy favors tribal sovereignty.145
States undoubtedly will claim a strong interest in protecting
their environment. This interest is, of course, enhanced when on-
reservation activities are polluting the resources outside Indian coun-
try. 1 46  A state's interest in a particular situation is heightened
relative to the extent and threat of the pollution. Finally, a state's
interest will be stronger when it provides some services in connection
with on-reservation regulation.147
Any state that seeks to regulate a reservation's environment
will have to overcome significant evidentiary burdens4s and likely will
142. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. at 335.
143. See Environmental Protection Agency, Office of External Affairs, Indian Policy
Statement (Nov. 1984). See also Spaeth, American Indian Law Deskbook at 274 (cited in note 5)
(quoting Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Federal Activities, Discussion Paper on
Indian Policy 35, stating the current policy is to "endeavor where appropriate to give tribal
governments the primary role in environmental program management and decision-making
relating to EPA's delegable programs on reservation lands").
144. See, for example, White Mountain Apache Tribe, 448 U.S. at 148. See also notes 83-
107 and accompanying text; Warren Trading Post Co., 380 U.S. at 688.
145. Virtually all federal environmental statutes apply to reservations. See note 48. In
addition to having a broad presence in the field of environmental regulation, the federal go-
vernment also may have a specific interest in promoting certain projects. For example, in
Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. at 343-44, the Court held that the federal government's
cooperation with the tribe to develop its game and fish resources-providing a source of income
from normative hunters and fishermen-preempted the state from applying its regulations. See
notes 84-85 and accompanying text. Therefore, if a tribe accepted the federal government's
nuclear waste, see note 33 and accompanying text, the state likely would be powerless over the
disposal site because the federal government presumably would work closely with the tribe to
set up and manage the site.
146. The Court in Mescalero Apache Tribe recognized that the state had not argued that its
attempted regulation of the tribe was justified due to any off-reservation effects that the tribe's
regulations were causing. 462 U.S. at 342. At the same time, the Court did not indicate the
significance that such a finding would have made on the outcome of the case.
147. See Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 163 (allowing state to tax on-reservation activities
of nonnatives when the state contributed funding to the on-reservation activities). Under
Cotton Petroleum, a state that subsidized the construction of a landfill on a reservation might
have a stronger interest in regulating that landfill.
148. For a similar analysis of this balancing test reaching the opposite conclusion of this
Note, see Spaeth, American Indian Law Deskbook at 267-76 (cited in note 5). For an argument
that states probably have authority to regulate hazardous waste activity inside Indian country,
see generally Leslie Allen, Who Should Control Hazardous Waste on Native American Lands?
Looking Beyond Washington Department of Ecology v. EPA, 14 Ecology L. Q. 69 (1987). For an
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have to show at a minimum that on-reservation activities are pollut-
ing the off-reservation environment. Although the dicta in the cur-
rent case law indicates that courts will consider seriously a state's
interest in protecting its environment when on-reservation activities
have off-reservation effects, it remains unclear whether the state's
interest in such situations will persuade a court to permit regulation
of nonnatives inside the reservation .14 A state will be most successful
when: (1) an on-reservation activity causes significant off-reservation
effects;10 (2) the tribe has a de minimis interest in the activity;15' (3)
no federal statutes cover the activity the state seeks to regulate;152
and (4) the state contributes either funding or resources to the on-
reservation activity. 53
While recognizing that the interests supporting tribal sover-
eignty might make tribal immunity from state statutes an equitable
rule in most situations, the circumstances peculiar to environmental
problems warrant a modification of this doctrine. In the environ-
mental arena, many tribal activities create ramifications that spill
well beyond the boundaries of the reservation. The need to allow
states to have some regulatory authority over the reservation envi-
ronment is enhanced by the knowledge that nonnatives seeking to
escape stricter state laws own many of the polluting operations.15 4
The law must, therefore, strike a balance that upholds both tribal
sovereignty and states' powers to safeguard their natural resources.
analysis of this balancing test reaching the same conclusion as this Note, see Royster and
Fausett, 64 Wash. L. Rev. at 649-57 (cited in note 48).
149. The uncertainty regarding whether a state may ever regulate normatives inside
Indian country is enhanced by the fact the Court in Cotton Petroleum-perhaps the principal
case granting states authority inside reservations-applied an analysis in the oil and gas tax
area that is strikingly different from the analysis the Court has applied to regulatory matters.
See note 110.
150. See note 146 and accompanying text. Some commentators have suggested the state's
interest in preventing pollution inside its borders might not be as strong as would be anticipated
when compared to the tribal sovereignty interests:
Many of the legitimate state interests-uniform laws, spillover concerns, and enforce-
ment issues-are being addressed through increased attention by EPA to pollution con-
trol in Indian country, the growth of tribal programs to address specific and overall en-
vironmental concerns, and cooperative agreements between tribes and states. In any
case, many of these state interests are no greater in the state-tribal context than they
are with regard to neighboring states. Spillovers and problems with lack of uniform
laws potentially plague any situation involving contiguous jurisdiction.
Royster and Fausett, 64 Wash. L. Rev. at 654 (cited in note 48) (citations omitted).
151. For example, the activity is one which involves no tribal resources and which produces
a product that will be used exclusively outside the reservation. See notes 93, 138, and accompa-
nying text.
152. See note 92 and accompanying text.
153. See note 94 and accompanying text.
154. See Part II.
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IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO CLOSE THE LOOPHOLE
Two potential paths may be taken to address this problem.
First, courts may interpret tribal sovereignty jurisprudence in a way
that permits states to enforce their environmental regulations on
reservations in some situations. Second, Congress could adopt legis-
lation authorizing the Interior Secretary to waive tribal sovereignty
and allow states to enforce their regulations when necessary to reduce
pollution of the state's environment. As a matter of feasibility, uni-
formity, and practicality, the latter solution is the preferable one.
A. The Judicial Path
Despite the current interpretation of tribal sovereignty gener-
ally prohibiting states from regulating reservations, the possibility
exists that courts will grant states regulatory authority over Indian
reservations in the environmental arena. This solution, however, is
unlikely. If a state seeks to regulate Indians who are threatening the
state's environment, it will have to establish that an "exceptional
circumstance" exists allowing application of the state statute.1 55 A
state is more likely to be successful in regulating activities inside
Indian country if it attempts to apply its statutes only to nonnative
operations. 1 6 The state, however, still would have to assert a suffi-
ciently strong interest to overcome the reservation's and the federal
government's interests 157 in tribal sovereignty. To date, no state has
met this burden in the environmental context.
Yet, even if a court permitted a state to enforce such a statute,
the judicial path would remain an inadequate path. A court might
decide a state could regulate only nonnatives and their activities
because the state faces a lower burden in applying its statutes to
nonnatives.18 In such a case, however, the state statute would not
reach dangerous operations in which Indians engage. 159
Environmental problems are ignorant of who causes them. Yet, a
judicial approach likely would distinguish regulation of pollution by
155. Courts could analogize a situation to the circumstances in Puyallup Tribe, in which
the Court permitted the state to apply laws that are "reasonable and necessary" for conservation
of various wild species. 433 U.S. at 180. Similarly, courts could permit a state to enforce a
statute "reasonable and necessary" for protecting certain common elements of the state envi-
ronment, such as groundwater or air. See notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
156. See Part III.B.
157. See Part III.A.
158. See White Mountain Apache Tribe, 448 U.S. at 151. See also Part III.B.
159. See Part III.C.
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Indians from pollution caused by nonnatives.16O From an
environmental perspective, this distinction is unjustified. 16'
A final disadvantage of a judicial solution is the impracticality
of implementing it. First, different courts likely would waive sover-
eignty in different situations, creating a problem of disuniformity.
Second, judges are not experts in geology and environmental science.
They would have difficulty assessing the amount of, or potential for,
environmental harm outside the reservation.162 Finally, if courts were
to start making exceptions to protecting tribal sovereignty, states
might flood the courts in an attempt to enforce every environmental
statute on every reservation. A judicial solution therefore faces
significant legal and practical hurdles.
B. The Legislative Path
The most effective way to strike a balance between preventing
harm to the environment and protecting tribal sovereignty interests is
for Congress to enact legislation that considers these concerns. The
purpose of such a statute would be to ensure that activities within a
reservation's borders do not damage the environment 163 while, at the
same time, protecting the rights of native tribes to "make their own
laws and be ruled by them."164
The proposed model statute that follows enables Congress to
make a policy choice that balances the tribal, federal, and state inter-
ests. For example, the statute balances these interests in such a way
that states may apply their statutes to reservations when activities
inside Indian country are damaging, or threatening to damage, the
state's environment. At the same time, it demands that states trump
tribal and federal interests to the least possible extent. The model
160. See, for example, Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 480-
83 (holding a state cigarette sales tax applicable to on-reservation sales to nontribal members,
but not to sales to reservation members).
161. New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe recognized this same concern. The Court held
that a regulatory scheme in which members would be governed by tribal ordinance and non-
members would be regulated by general state hunting and fishing laws would create an
"inconsistent" dual system and "severely hinder the ability of the Tribe to conduct a sound man-
agement program." 462 U.S. at 339.
162. This problem could threaten the interests of both the states and the tribes. A judge
who incorrectly finds no damage to the state will injure the state because the pollution will
continue. A judge who incorrectly finds damage to the tribe will injure the tribe because the
state-law enforcement will interfere with the tribe's interest in self-government.
163. A statute should define damage to the environment as damage not only to human
beings, but to wildlife and the physical environment as well. This ensures that the statute
would apply to reservations far isolated from population centers.
164. New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. at 343-44. See Part III-.A
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statute waives sovereignty only when applying the state regulations
would improve the environment-it prohibits states from enforcing
regulations unless they are more stringent than the tribe's. The
statute applies with equal force to activities operated by Indians on
reservations and activities operated by nonnatives on reservations.
And, perhaps most importantly, it effectively destroys the incentives
for nonnatives to move onto reservations to avoid tighter state
pollution controls. Finally, the framework of the model statute
recognizes the different challenges posed by new industrial activities
starting up on a reservation-such as landfills-and ongoing




When a tribe seeks to initiate a new industrial activity on a
reservation, the statute would require the Interior Secretary166 or his
agents, upon a petition fied by the state, to assess the probability
that the operation will pollute or degrade natural resources outside
the reservation. Upon a showing that the activity likely will threaten
the state's environment, the Interior Secretary could require the tribe
to ensure that the facility operates at a level consistent with the
state's standards. The Interior Secretary also could allow state
officials to inspect the on-reservation facilities consistent with the
state regulations if the tribe's inspection policies are inadequate
compared to the state's standard. Tribes would have the option, how-
ever, of creating their own inspection programs that meet or exceed
the state's requirements if they prefer to keep state officials from
having any direct control over their activities.
The application of particular state standards should depend
upon the nature of the reservation activity and the type of natural
resource allegedly threatened. For example, an incinerator at the
bottom of a valley in the center of a reservation likely would not
threaten a state's aquifer. Therefore, the state's clean water act stan-
dards would be inapplicable. Incinerator operations might, however,
jeopardize the state's air quality. As a result, the state's air pollution
control regulation would apply in the reservation even though the
state's water act would not. This ensures that both the state's and
165. A general overview of the model statute's approach is provided in Part IV.B. The
statute's operation is discussed in greater detail following each provision in the Appendix.




the tribe's interests are protected to the maximum extent; the state
may interfere with the tribe's right of self government when its
resources are threatened, but only to the extent necessary to protect
such interests.
2. Existing Activities
If an ongoing operation on a reservation pollutes the state
environment, 16 7 a state would petition the Interior Secretary to waive
tribal sovereignty and allow the state to enforce a particular
environmental statute on the reservation. The Interior Secretary
would then balance various claims asserted by the tribe and the
federal government to determine if the state statute should apply.
The Interior Secretary would have broad discretion to determine
whether a state regulation would apply to the entire reservation or
only the points where the pollution is created and/or crosses the
tribe's border.
3. Authority for the Model Statute
Congress has clear constitutional authority to pass such a
statute. As to new operations, Congress may grant the Interior
Department authority to condition approval of new projects on reser-
vations based on factors relating to the surrounding or neighboring
state.168 Congress has power to waive tribal sovereignty and allow
states to apply their statutes to reservations under certain circum-
stances. Further, Congress may authorize the Interior Secretary to
167. These provisions of the statute would apply in equal force to Indian activities inciden-
tal to everyday life as well as to 'tribal" operations owned by nonnatives that pollute outside of
Indian country. Therefore, the model statute regulates activities such as landfills designated
only for tribal use such as tribal septic systems. See note 22.
168. See, for example, Indian Gaming Regulatory Act ("IGRA), 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701 et seq.
The IGRA requires that a tribe negotiate a compact with a state concerning certain casino
operating criteria, such as hours of operation, before the Secretary of the Interior grants a
permit to the tribe to operate the casino. 25 U.S.C. § 2710. Although several courts have
questioned the constitutionality of the IGRA, their scrutiny focuses on whether the statute
violates the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments by mandating that states enter into compacts
with tribes. See, for example, Ponca Tribe of Oklahoma v. State of Oklahoma, 1994 WL 476316
(10th Cir. 1994) (holding that the IGRA does not violate the Tenth Amendment). Therefore, the
controversy surrounding the IGRA is not related to the analogous support it provides for the
model statute. For a general discussion of cases analyzing the constitutionality of the IGRA, see
generally William T. Bisset, Tribal-Stake Gaming Compacts: The Constitutionality of the
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 21 Hastings L. Q. 71 (1993).
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waive tribal sovereignty based on criteria that Congress establishes in
the statute.16
9
This legislative answer is the preferable approach to closing
the legal loophole that exists today. Long-standing congressional acts
indicate the legal foundation for this model statute exists. Such a
statute would provide a uniform method of dealing with this problem
as the Interior Department could establish consistent and efficient
policies and regulations. And the floodgates concern is not as great
because the Interior Department administratively could reject
frivolous state claims much more quickly than courts. In fact, the
model statute commands the Secretary to reject claims absent
evidence pollution is threatening, or could threaten, the state's
environment.
Perhaps most important, such a statute would serve to solve
the problem of nonnatives moving onto reservations to avoid stricter
state restrictions. The statute wipes out the incentive to enter Indian
country unless the operation can locate in an area on a reservation
that would not threaten the neighboring state's environment. And
facilities already in operation would have to meet the state's stan-
dards if they caused or threatened pollution outside the reservation.
At the same time, the statute continues to protect tribal and
federal interests to the fullest extent possible. The statute will lower
the shield of sovereignty only when the state's interests in protecting
its environment are significant and likely to be realized. It permits
states to apply only the statutes and regulations addressing the spe-
cific type of pollution affecting the state and only over such an area
where it is necessary to regulate.
V. CONCLUSION
It is ironic that as state environmental laws are growing more
stringent, the threat to the states' environment remains, to some
extent, constant. This irony, in part, results from a legal loophole
169. See, for example, 25 U.S.C. § 231 (1988) (discussed in note 50). The Act reads, in
relevant part:
The Secretary of the Interior, under such rules and regulations as he may prescribe,
shall permit the agents and employees of any State to enter upon Indian tribal lands,
reservations, or allotments therein (1) for the purpose of making inspection of health
and educational conditions and enforcing sanitation and quarantine regulations or (2) to
enforce the penalties of State compulsory school attendance laws against Indian children
25 U.S.C. § 231.
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that allows nonnatives to move onto Indian reservations and ignore
tighter state regulations. Because pollution fails to recognize the
tribal sovereignty doctrine and political boundaries, a solution must
be implemented to ensure that state plans to protect their resources
are not frustrated by either overly rigid or unpredictable legal doc-
trine. The best solution is for Congress to enact legislation that both
gives states power to regulate the reservation environment when
necessary and still recognizes the deeply embedded principles of tribal
self-government.1
70
Roger Romulus Martella, Jr.*
170. Although the solution this Note suggests is the most feasible from a legal perspective;
a legal approach is not necessarily the only approach that could be taken to solve distressed
environmental problems that both states and Indian tribes face:
I would urge that the whole concept of nature be rethought. Nature, the land, must not
mean money; it must designate life. Nature is the storehouse of potential life of future
generations and is sacred. Human societies already possess the technologies necessary
to provide food, clothing, and shelter for everyone. The organization of distribution of
wealth needs to be repaired, for that imbalance destroys both contemporary and future
life and nature. Western society needs to prioritize life-supporting systems and to ques-
tion its commitment to materialism. Spirituality should be our foundation....
Onondaga Clan Mother Audrey Shenandoah, quoted in Wall and Arden, Wisdomkeepers at 27
(cited in note 3), from a keynote address she delivered to former Soviet President Gorbachev and
former United Nations Secretary General Perez de Cuellar at a 1990 Moscow conference.
* This Note benefited from the thoughtful advice and contributions of several individu-
als. The Author is particularly appreciative of the comments of the following people who
sacrificed a significant amount of time to assist in the drafting of this Note: Professor Donald J.
Hall for scrutinizing and improving the model statute; Professor Nancy J. King for suggesting
how to improve the Note's structure; the City Desk staff at the Syracuse Post-Standard for





25 U.S.C. § 3601
CHAPTER 38-
INDIAN ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS CONTROL ACT
§ 3601 Congressional declaration of policy
The purposes of this chapter are-
(1) to provide a statutory basis for ensuring that activities
on Indian lands do not damage the physical environment and natural
resources of individuals outside such lands;
(2) to protect the physical environment and natural re-
sources of states neighboring Indian lands from activities on
reservations that may damage those concerns outside Indian lands;
(3) to reduce substantially the incentive that non-Indians
presently possess to move onto tribal lands in order to avoid stringent
state environmental regulations and taxes; and
(4) to ensure that Indians retain their fundamental rights
to self-government, self-determination, and self-regulation to the
fullest extent possible, and that the federal government's interest in
protecting such rights is recognized before states are permitted to
regulate activities inside Indian lands.
Comment: The primary purpose of this act is to protect the environment of
lands outside Indian country. The preeminence of this goal is reflected in the
provisions below that place the burden on the tribes and federal government to
block application of a state statute once the state demonstrates that harm to its
resources is likely or is occurring. At the same time, the policy remains
conscious of the important tribal interests flowing from the backdrop of tribal
sovereignty as well as the federal government's role in protecting those interests.
§ 3602 Definitions
(1) The term "Indian lands" means-
(A) all lands within the limits of any reservation; and
(B) any lands title to which is either held in trust by the
United States for the benefit of any Indian tribe or individual or held
by any Indian tribe or individual subject to restriction by the United
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States against alienation and over which an Indian tribe exercises
governmental power.
(2) The term "Indian tribe" means any Indian tribe, band, nation,
or other organized group or community of Indians which-
(A) is recognized as eligible by the Secretary for the special
programs and services provided by the United States to Indians be-
cause of their status as Indians, and
(B) is recognized as possessing powers of self-government.
(3) The term "industrial activity" means any activity, operation, or
service conducted within Indian lands that alters or has the capacity
to alter the condition of the physical environment.
(4) The term "operator" means a person or enterprise engaged in
conducting the industrial activity. Operator includes, but is not lim-
ited to, Indians, Indian-run industrial activities, nonnative persons,
or nonnative-run industrial activities.
(5) The term "physical environment" includes the health of
individuals, and resources including, but not limited to, wild and
aquatic life and natural resources.
(6) The term "Secretary" means the Secretary of the Interior.
Comment: The terms "Indian lands," "Indian tribe," and "Secretary" are
adapted from definitions commonly used in recently-enacted statutes addressing
Indian issues.171
The statute defines "industrial activity" broadly to regulate virtually any
activity that in some way could affect the physical environment outside Indian
country. Presumably under the definition, a landfill operated by a nonnative
company would be covered, as would be a septic system serving a small tribal
community.
The statute also adopts a broad definition of "operator" to allow the
Interior Department discretion in locating a party liable for damages when
necessary. The statute explicitly mentions that both Indians and nonnatives can
be held liable under the statute.
The statute defines the 'physical environment" expansively to include
natural resources and the general health of individuals. This is to ensure that
the statute covers more than physical damage to the environment-the act
guards the health of individuals and protects wildlife as well.
171. See, for example, the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. § 2703.
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§ 3603 New industrial activities on Indian lands
(a) Obligation to report initiation of new activity
A tribe must notify the appropriate state officials in states
neighboring the tribe's lands when a new industrial activity is in-
tended to be commenced on the reservation. If the state seeks to
regulate the operation of the new activity, it may bring a proceeding
pursuant to subsection (b).
Comment: The provision imposes a reporting requirement on tribes to inform
states potentially effected by a new industrial activity on a reservation. Before
the new activity commences on the reservation, the tribe must inform states
neighboring the tribe. Such states may then bring a proceeding under this
Section either to gain permission to regulate the activity or to stop the activity's
initiation if the state believes that the activity will damage the state's physical
environment.
(b) When new activity may begin
When a state demonstrates by a preponderance to the Interior
Secretary that a proposed industrial activity inside a reservation
could damage the physical environment outside the reservation, the
activity may not commence until the Secretary grants a permit under
subparagraphs (c) or (e) allowing the operation to begin. The
Secretary may grant the permit contingent on the tribe or enterprise's
agreement to accept certain conditions the Secretary sets forth as
provided in subsection (d).
Comment: The trigger phrase here is "could damage." Before a proposed
industrial activity on a reservation falls within the scope of this statute, the state
must meet its burden of establishing that the activity poses a threat to the state's
physical environment. This initial burden enables the Interior Secretary to
reject frivolous state complaints early in the administrative process if he finds
that the threat of damage to the state's environment is highly unlikely.
Frivolous complaints could arise in two situations: (1) when it is clear that the
on-reservation activity could not pollute the state's environment because of the
relative geological location and geographical features of the location of the
activity and the reservation's borders; and (2) when the nature of the activity is
such that any detrimental effect on the physical environment is unlikely.
The provision also mak q a policy choice in favor of protecting the state's
environment. Once the state. teets its burden by showing that the new activity
could damage its environment, the Interior Secretary is required to suspend the
initiation of the operation until the agency grants a permit. However,
establishing this burden does not mean that necessarily the tribe will have to
comply with state standards and regulations. Rather, as described in (c), the
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result of proving that threatened harm could exist merely triggers further
analysis into whether or not such harm likely will occur.
(C) Finding damage is likely
In deciding whether to grant the permit, the Secretary shall
consider evidence from the tribe, the federal government, and the
state concerning whether or not the activity threatens to damage the
environment outside Indian lands. If the Secretary finds the state
has demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that the proposed
activity would likely damage the state's physical environment, and
that applying the state's standards and regulations will diminish the
likelihood of such damage, the Secretary may decide whether to grant
the permit subject to conditions or deny the permit pursuant to sub-
section (d).
Comment: The purpose of this provision is to decide whether the new activity
"would likely" damage the state's environment. This hurdle will be a
significantly higher one for the state to clear than the "could threaten" standard
in subparagraph (b)-both because the burden of persuasion is now clear and
convincing rather than a preponderance of the evidence and because it will be
more difficult to establish the likelihood of injury rather than the mere
possibility of injury. The state also will have to rebut evidence offered by the
tribe and the federal government. If the state is unable to meet its burden, the
Secretary will grant the permit to operate the new activity without any influence
from state regulations. These enhanced procedural devices further protect tribal
and federal interests growing from the tribal sovereignty doctrine.
Finally, if the state standards are equivalent to or less stringent than the
tribal standards, the Secretary must grant the permit without any conditions.
This prevents the state from taking control of a reservation activity merely
because it would prefer to have greater control over the tribe. However, if the
state does establish that pollution would be less likely under the state's
standards, the agency has two options. The Secretary can grant the permit
subject to certain conditions described in subsection (d) or the Secretary can
deny the permit.
Despite the procedural constraints designed to protect tribal and federal
interests, the statute makes a clear policy choice in favor of protecting the
environment. Upon establishing that the activity is likely to harm the state's
environment, the Secretary is ordered to apply the state environmental
regulations or deny the permit regardless of any strong tribal or federal
government interests.
(d) Conditional granting of permit
The Interior Secretary may elect to grant a permit subject to
certain conditions if the state establishes by clear and convincing
evidence that the proposed activity would likely damage the state's
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physical environment under subparagraph (b). Such conditions may
include-
(1) that the activity be operated in conformance with
applicable state standards and regulations; and
(2) that the tribe permit periodic state inspection of the
facility consistent with current state laws, or, in the
alternative, that the tribe implement its own inspection
program that meets or exceeds the state's monitoring
requirements.
The Secretary may reject the permit only if the state estab-
lishes by clear and convincing evidence that the activities will damage
the state's physical environment under any conditions that could be
imposed under this subsection and that the state regulations would
outlaw the activity if it were conducted in the state.
Comment: This subsection assures that activities inside reservations that
threaten the state's environment will be operated in compliance with state
pollution and inspection standards. By employing the word "applicable," the
subsection ensures that only the statutes regulating the particular harm that
threatens the state's environment will apply. Therefore, a state statute
regulating air but not water will apply to a particular activity if the pollution
from the activity affects only the state's air, and not its water quality, even if the
activity pollutes the water inside the reservation.
The Secretary is authorized to deny a permit only if imposing conditions
on the activity will not alleviate the likelihood of damage to the state's physical
environment. Furthermore, the Secretary may deny the permit only if the state
regulations would prohibit the activity. This serves as a further safeguard to
ensure that the states are not able to regulate activities inside reservations more
strictly than they can regulate activities outside reservations.
(e) Finding damage is unlikely
If the state fails to establish by clear and convincing evidence
that the industrial activity will likely damage the physical environ-
ment outside the reservation, or that applying the state's standards
and regulations will not diminish the likelihood of such damage, the
Secretary will grant the permit to operate the activity without being
subject to further conditions.
Comment: Subsection (e) is the inverse to subsection (c) and makes clear that an
industrial activity that likely will not damage the physical environment outside
the reservation will not be subject to state regulation. Furthermore, it confirms
that states will only be able to enforce statutes within reservations that are more
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effective at preventing damage than other regulations that are currently
applicable to the reservation.
(f) Effect of finding damage is unlikely
A finding that a proposed industrial activity either could not
damage, or is not likely to damage, the physical environment outside
the reservation shall not preclude the state from seeking to require
that the activity be operated consistent with state standards and
regulations at a later date under Section 3604 of this Act, if the state
establishes that such activity is actually damaging the state's physical
environment in accordance with that Section.
Comment: This provision will enable a state to bring a proceeding under § 3604
to apply its regulations to an activity that the Secretary previously permitted if
the activity is later proven to be polluting the state's environment.
§ 3604 Existing activities on Indian lands
(a) When state standards are imposed
When a state demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence
that an industrial activity inside Indian lands is damaging the physi-
cal environment outside the reservation, the Secretary shall order
that the operators conduct the activity consistent with applicable
state standards and regulations, unless the tribe or federal govern-
ment demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that imposing
such restrictions will interfere unreasonably with the tribal and fed-
eral interests pursuant to subparagraph (b). In determining whether
activity is actually damaging the physical environment outside Indian
lands, the Secretary may consider evidence from the tribe, the federal
government, and the state. The Secretary may not impose state stan-
dards or regulations on a reservation activity that will not diminish
the damage outside the reservation.
Comment: A state attempting to regulate existing activities must demonstrate
that the activity on the reservation is actually polluting the state's environment
by clear and convincing evidence. The tribe and federal government may offer
evidence to rebut the state's evidence. If the state meets its burden, the tribe and
federal government can attempt to show that enforcing the state statute inside
the reservation would interfere with tribal sovereignty in an "unreasonable"
way. The Secretary is ordered to make this determination of reasonableness
pursuant to subsection (b).
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To summarize, once the state demonstrates injury to its environment, the
burden is on the tribe and federal government to prove that their interests are so
strong that the state should not be permitted to apply the statute. This again
reflects the policy choice in favor of protecting the environment over interfering
with tribal sovereignty.
A distinction therefore exists between § 3603 that regulates new activities
and § 3604 that regulates existing activities in terms of the weight given to
tribal and state interests. Under § 3603, once a state demonstrates that on-
reservation activities will likely harm the state's environment, the Interior
Secretary is ordered to abrogate the tribe's and federal government's interests in
tribal sovereignty. However, § 3604 requires the Interior Secretary to consider
the tribal and federal government interests before lowering the sovereignty
shield. The justification for this distinction is that interfering with an activity
already operating on a reservation raises greater concerns that the state is
interfering with tribal self-government and self-regulation. Therefore, it is more
critical that the asserted state, tribal, and federal government interests be closely
examined and balanced.
(b) Tribal and federal factors
Applying a state statute on a reservation unreasonably inter-
feres with tribal and federal interests in tribal sovereignty when the
state regulations would preclude tribal economic development and
self-sufficiency or when the state regulations would effectively destroy
a tribe's ability to govern itself. In determining whether a state
regulation will unreasonably interfere with tribal sovereignty
interests, the Secretary shall consider-
(1) the right of Indian tribes to govern themselves and
regulate their environment;
(2) the policy of the federal government to protect Indian
tribes' rights of self-determination, self-government, and self-
regulation; and
(3) the policy of the federal government to promote
economic development and self-sufficiency of the tribes, as
reflected in other acts in this Title.
Comment: This subsection ensures that the Secretary will consider the tribe's
and the federal government's traditional interests in tribal sovereignty before
deciding to apply the state statute. First, the provision sets forth objective
criteria for determining whether or not state regulations "unreasonably"
interfere with the tribal and federal government interests: enforcing the state
regulations either would block economic development or would prevent the tribe
from being able to govern itself. Second, the provision enumerates certain
criteria that the Secretary should consider when making the objective decision.
The subsection ends with a general reference to Title 25 of the United States
Code-the title that regulates Indian affairs-to allow the tribe and the federal
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government to make use of policies from other statutes in attempting to block
application of the state statute.
(c) Effect of finding no damage
A determination that a proposed industrial activity either is
not damaging the physical environment outside the reservation, or
that applying a state regulation would unreasonably interfere with
tribal and federal interests, shall not preclude the state from seeking
to require that the activity be operated consistent with state stan-
dards and regulations at a later date under this Section if the state
establishes pursuant to this Section that such activity is in fact dam-
aging the state's physical environment and if the state establishes by
a preponderance of the evidence that the operation of the industrial
activity or the condition of the physical environment has changed
significantly so as to warrant re-consideration.
Comment: This provision serves the same purpose as § 3603(e), yet requires that
the state show that "the situation has changed significantly" before it can bring
a second proceeding to enforce its regulations
§ 3605 Failure to comply
The Secretary may enjoin the operator of any activity that fails
to comply with applicable standards and regulations under Section
3603(b) or Section 3604(a) from operating the damaging activity. The
Secretary also may require any party who violates this Act remedy
any damage caused to the physical environment outside the
reservation by requiring the operator pay compensatory and punitive
damages to the state or any other parties outside Indian lands
damaged by the industrial activity.
Comment: This section imposes two separate remedies for failing to comply
with other provisions of the Act. First, the Secretary has the power to enjoin any
operation that is in violation of an order under § 3603 or § 3604. Second, any
operator may be liable for the compensatory damages to remedy the injury that
the operator causes to a state's environment, as well as punitive damages.
§ 3606 Regulations
The Secretary, after notice and opportunity for public com-
ment, and at least three months before the effective date of this stat-
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ute, shall promulgate regulations implementing the provisions of this
statute. Such regulations may describe, but shall not be limited to-
(1) standards regarding when an industrial activity inside
a reservation could damage the physical environment outside
the reservation and when such activity will likely damage the
environment outside Indian lands under § 3603;
(2) standards regarding when an industrial activity inside
a reservation is damaging the physical environment outside
the reservation and when imposing state standards and
regulations unreasonably interferes with tribal and federal
interests under § 3604; and
(3) the procedures and documents that states, tribes, and
the federal government should apply in accordance with this
statute.
Comment: By adopting regulations that provide detail on when the burdens in
this provision will be met, the legislative approach will further the goal of
implementing a consistent, efficient, and objective method for waiving tribal
sovereignty in applicable situations. Furthermore, the Secretary also is
encouraged to adopt regulations that implement the procedural aspects of the
statute.
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